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SUMMARY
The topic of this work covers the fiscal aspects of the disposal of shares from the taxpayer's
private capital. The research is undedaken in a comparative scope in which the fiscal systems
of Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are included.
The first question to be asked is whether profits resulting from the disposal of shares
should be subject to taxation. Under the system of the United Kingdom capital gains in
general are regarded more or less like ordinary income and are as a rule subject to taxation. In
the other countries, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, capital gains are not regarded as
ordinary income and as a rule these gains are not subject to taxation unless the gains are
realized in the course ofa business. Capital gains on the disposal ofprivate capital should as a
rule not be subject to taxation unless 'certain conditions' are met. In this respect all these
countries (except the United Kingdom) distinguish between substantial an non-substantial
participation holders. The United Kingdom Capital Gains Tax is comparable to the substantial
participation rules in the other countries.
Substantial participation holders canbe regarded as 'comparable to'persons carryring out a
business. Therefore gains arising from the disposal ofshares should be subject to taxation.
This justification for the substantial participation rule can be found in the systems of Belgium,
Germany as well as The Netherlands. In all these countries the qualification 'substantial
shareholder' is in some way related to the extensiveness of the interest in the company. The
yudstick used to measure the interest differs extensively between the countries examined. The
main differences are the way in which shares held by family members are treated and the
minimal percentage used for qualifuing a participation as substantial.
In Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands gains realized by non-substantial shareholders
are subject to taxation provided that the administration of the privately held shares was
conducted for income-making rather than consumption purposes. The system of the Nether-
i lands does not contain a special provision for the taxation ofthis type ofcapital gains, and the
jpossibilities for taxation are small. The German system does provide for a special provision
under which gains on the disposal ofprivate capital are subjected to taxation under the condi-
tion that the disposal takes place within a specific period following the acquisition of the asset
disposed of. Under the Belgium system these type of gains are subject to taxation if the gains
from administration that can not be regarded to be 'normal'. The answer to the question
whether a certain specific form of administration can be regarded to be 'normal' depends
nainly on the specific circumstances of the case.
Substantial participations
lnorder for a substantial shareholder to be taxed under the substantial participation rule a
disposal is required. Speaking in broad terms all the national systems of Belgium, Germany,
Netherlands and the United Kingdom use the same concept of 'disposal',but at some
ints differences occur:
-Disposals by way of gift are taxed in different ways. Under the system of the Netherlands
the United Kingdom disposals by way of gift are taxed using the market value of the
as consideration. In Belgium and Germany the shares are supposed to be acquired for
price ofacquisition paid by the person disposing ofthe shares by way ofgift. Ifthe shares
not form part ofa substantial holding after the disposal by way ofgift, the shaÍes are
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subject to the substantial holding rule for five more years.
- Substantial differences occur where the disposal involves the company in which the
shares are held (e.g. the purchase by the company ofits own shares). In these cases the pro-
blem occurs that from the point of view of the company the consideration paid can be regar-
ded as a distribution.
- Differences also occur in cases ofdeath ofthe shareholder. Under the system ofthe
United Kingdom the death of the shareholder does not lead to a disposal, and the heirs can use
the market value at the time of death as the price of acquisition. Under the other systems the
death of a shareholder either leads to a deemed disposal at market value or to an acquisition at
the purchase price equal to the price ofpurchase applicable to the person who died.
- Under the systems of Germany and the Netherlands, the emigration of a substantial
participation shareholder leads to an "exit-charge". It not only can be doubted whether the
levy is in accordance with the EC Treaty, but it can be stated that this kind of taxation is not in
accordance with tax heaties. Under the OECD model double taxation convention gains from
the disposal ofshares by individuals are taxable in the state ofresidence. The exit-charge is
not in line with this intemationally accepted principle. It is recommended to implement a
system under which the profit emerging from a disposal of shares is shared between all the
countries the disposer has been resident of during the time the shares were held.
- A substantial participation holder who does not qualify as a substantial participation
holder after he has disposed of a part of his interest in the company is treated differently under
the different systems. In the Netherlands this shareholder is deemed to have disposed of his
whole holding. In Belgium and Germany a different system is used. The shareholder is
regarded to be a substantial shareholder for a period offive years following the disposal.
-The Belgium substantial holding rule includes a very distinctive feature: a disposal will
only lead to taxation if the acquirer of the shares disposed of is member of a group ofqualify-
ing acquirers. This group is very limited, and as a result the scope of the Belgium substantial
participation rule is very limited.
In broad terms all countries involved in this study use the same formula to calculate the profit
emerging from the disposal. The main point of difference is the way in which inflation is
taken into account. In both Germany and the Netherlands the influence of inflation is igrord,
The Belgium system is equipped with a rule that is supposed to take inflation out of the profil
but the system used is highly inappropriate to meet this goal. The system of indexation
allowances that used to be applicable in the United Kingdom did remove inflation from the
chargeable gain. This system was however frozen andreplaced by a syst€m under which the
gain from the disposal is lowered according to the time the shares were held by the share
holder.
Under the system of the United Kingdom the profit arising from the disposal of shares is taxd
using the rate of income tax that would be applicable if the gain would be a part of income for
the income tax. In the other counhies a special rate is used. This rate is one form or the other
linked with the regular rate of the income tax, but in all cases this rate is lower than the
standard rate.
380
Under all the systems, ex(
which this compensation I
Non-substantial participr
Only the systems ofBelgir
to non-substantial sharehol
the non-substantial holding
safe to conclude that, broad
the substantial holding rule.
None of the mentioned systt
disposal by a non-substantia
applicable are more or less tlparticipation.
Only under the Belgium systparticipation holder is taxed r
of the Netherlands this profit
In all the countries involved l
ons can be used to compensaÍr
Harmonization
A s^econd question this inquiry
different systems investigated :question can be answerà in u 1systems it appears to be possibJ
zationrvill actually take place i
a political question which is diÍ
In Chapter 6.4 the outlines of a
summaxy follows.
C-ountries not having a capital g
and non-substantial shareholden
ders will be submitted to a capitr
countries not having a capitafga
A substantial shareholder is defir
subscribed capital. A percentage
turther than twice removed and ctaxpayers jointly exercize control
A orrterence should be made beh
rs.
volves the comPany in which the
own shares)' In these cases the pro-
I the consideration paid can be regar-
eholder. Under the sYstem of the
lead to a disposal, and the heirs can use
luisition. Under the other systems the
i at market value or to an acquisition at
:able to the Person who died'
ts, the emigration of a substantial
roi only can be doubted whether the
stateíthat this kind of taxation is not in
double ta;<ation convention gains from
r state ofresidence. The exit-charge is
.It is recommended to imPlement a
ial of shares is shared between all the
time the shares were held'
ualifo as a substantial participation
, tfr" 
"o*p*y 
is treated differently under
Itter is deemád to have disposed of his
;vstem is used. The shareholder is
ífiu" y.u.t following the disposal'
iery diíinctive feature: a disposal will^
loráa orit member of a group of quali!-
JiÀ. t"op" of the Belgium substantial
re the same formula to calculate the profit
rence is the way in which inflation is
i*ds ,t 
" 
influence of inÍlation is igrrored'
t*oot.a to take inÍIation out of the profit
this eoal. The system of indexation
fi"ó"t did remove inÍlation from the
ndrJplaced by a system under which the
ime ihe shares were held by the share
arising from the disposal of shares is taxod
Ëif;f" gainwouldbe aPart of income fc
ir 
"t"a.ïrtit 
rate is one form or the othcr
r all cases this rate is lower than the
SUMMARY
Under all the systems, except for Belgium, compensation of losses is available. The form in
which this compensation takes place differs between the countries.
Non-substantial participations
Only the systems of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands contain special rules applicable
to non-substantial shareholders. With regard to the question when a disposal in the sènse of
the non-substantial holding takes place, non of the mentioned rules is vèry explicit. It seems
safe to conclude that, broadly speaking, more or less the same situations are meant as under
the substantial holding rule.
None of the mentioned systems contain explicit rules to calculate the profit emerging from a
disposal by a non-substantial participation holder. It appears save to cànclude that the rules
applicable are more or less the same as the rules applicable to the disposal of a substantial
participation.
0nly under the Belgium system the profit emerging form a disposal by a non-substantial
participation holder is taxed using a flat rcte. Under the German system and under the system
of the Netherlands this profit is taxed using the normal progressive rate of taxation.
In all the countries involved losses emerging from the disposal of non-substantial participati-
ons can be used to compensate other gains.
Harmonizatio
A second question this inquiry set out to answer was whether it is possible to harmonize the
different systems investigated in this study. Judging from the different tax acts studies this
question can be answered in a positive way. Due to the similarities found in the different
systems it appears to be possible to come to some degree of harmonization. Whether harmoni-
ation will actually take place is a more difficult question to answer, because this is ultimatelv
lpolitical question which is difficult to answer from the perspective of the law.
Inchapter 6.4 the outlines of a proposal for such a harmonized system can be found. A$mmnry follows.
,Countries not having a capital gains tax should distinguish between substantial shareholders
lndnon-substantial shareholders. Forthose countries having a capital gains tax all sharehol-
will be submitted to a capital gain tax along the lines to be implemented in
ies not having a capital gains tax for substantial shareholders.
should be made between full disposals, partial disposals, disposals in which the
381
substantial shareholder is defined as a taxpayer owing more than a certain percentage of
bscribed capital' A percentage of 25oÁ seems reasonable. Shares owned by relatives not
rther than twice removed and owned by other persons if it is reasonable to assume that thesejointly exercize control over the company could also be taken into account.
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corporation ofwhich the shares are alienated is a party, transfer ofshares due to decease, and
alienations ofshares owned by a shareholder who used to be, but no longer is a substantial
shareholder.
The capital gain to be taxed upon alienation is to be calculated as the consideration paid for
the shares disposed of minus purchase price minus costs. The consideration paid is to be
calculated as the value ofthe compensation offered to the shareholder, in case ofa partial
alienation a pro rata allocation of this compensation is pleaded for. The market value of
shares should be deemed as price ofacquisition in case due to the acquisition a substantial
participation arises, or in case of immigration.
The tax rate in case of substantial participation should be the same as the rate of other income
of the shareholder. Facilities taking into account personal circumstances hould be applicable
by allocating the capital gain to five years and assuming that this allocated capital gain is
taxed at the marginal rate applying to the taxpayer in that year. Compensation of losses should
take place.
In case ofa non-substantial participation capital gains should be taxed only in case ofspecula-
tion. In this indisputable speculation may be assumed if the shares are disposed of within one
year after acquisition. A disputable speculation arises ifthe shares are disposed of between
one and two yeaÍs after acquisition. Speculation may be proved by the tax inspector in case
shares are alienated between two and five years after acquisition. For longer periods no
speculation is to be assumed.
A special rate could be taken into account in case ofalienation ofshares between one year
after acquisition. In other cases the same rate applicable to substantial participations should be
used.
Losses derived from the disposal of a non-substantial paÍicipation may be compensated with
profits derived from such disposals.
Resident taxpayers are taxable on capital gains and speculation gains derived from the dispo-
sal ofboth shares il resident and non-resident companies. Non-resident shareholders will be
taxed only ifthey dispose ofshares in a company resident in the shareholders country of
source. Following the OECD-Model under tax treaties the country of residence should be
granted the right to tax. However, in case a shareholder was a resident in more than one
country during the holding period of his shares compartmenting should take place, thus giving
each country in which the shareholder was a resident the right to tax the capital gain that uose
during the period in which the shareholder was a resident in that counfiy.
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